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OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
CHRISTINA L. GRAY, and 
MARK J. GRAY 
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Case No. 20050136-CA 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
ARGUMENT 
I. APPELLANT'S TRIAL COUNSELS WERE INEFFECTIVE FOR NOT REQUfc i 
LESSER-INCLUDED OFFENSE JURY INSTRUCTION 
The State in its Brief of Appellee attempts to argue that Appellants' trial counsel was not 
ineffectih. c for not requesting a It ss< i iiin Ilium J en 11 if trust1 \\\\\ insliu lion Sn1 H r< fojAppeUev%\\ \\\\ 
9-23. The State contends that trial counsels' performance was not deficient because it reflected a 
legitimate trial strategy and that Appellants i 
deficient performance Id. 
A The Failure to Request a Lesser-Included Offense Jury Instruction Was h 
Legitimate Trial Strategy. 
The State's first attempts to argue that Appellants' trial counsels' strategies were to have their 
clients "exonerated," arguing that a lesser included offense jury instri it lionnir (hu> no) in lint1 t* iili 
their legitimate trial strategy. Brief of Appellee at pp. 10-14. Hartill and Farris' defenses as they 
were presented at trial in this matter, however, could not be construed so simplistically. 
The State recognizes Farris' defense as based on a "mistake of law" theory, stating that 
the Appellants "honestly and reasonably believed they were acting responsibly and legally in 
restraining J.G. to prevent him jfrom running away." Brief of Appellee at pp. 12-13. Jury 
Instruction No. 23 pertains to this defense, as is found under UTAH CODE ANN. §76-2-304(2). 
However, a thorough reading of §76-2-304 shows that subsection (3), which was absent from 
Jury Instruction No. 23, indicates that "[although an actor's ignorance or mistake of fact or law 
may constitute a defense to the offense charged, he may nevertheless be convicted of a lesser 
included offense of which he would be guilty if the fact or law were as he believed." By its 
plain language, this defense is not a complete defense and necessitated a request for a lesser 
included offense jury instruction. This is particularly true given Fanis' strategy to concede that 
the chaining in this matter had occurred, leaving only the element of intent at question. Farris, 
however, failed to adequately investigate clearly relevant law to his defense culminating in his 
failure to request the lesser-included offense jury instruction and effectively represent Mark 
Gray in this matter. See, State v. Ross. 951 P.2d 236,246 (Utah App., 1997). A legitimate trial 
strategy cannot be surmised from Farris' failure to request the lesser-included offense jury 
instruction1. 
1
 Even the trial court recognized that Appellants' may have been entitled to the 
lesser-included offense jury instruction based upon the facts of this case. On April 18,2005, 
the Appellants' motion for certificate of probable cause came for hearing before the Honorable 
Robin W. Reese of the Third Judicial District Court. See, Joint Motion for Certificate of 
Probable Cause and Memorandum in Support, filed May 19,2005 (the "Motion"). In his oral 
findings at the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Reese found that it was likely that, had the Grays 
requested a lesser included offense jury instruction at the conclusion of the trial they would have 
been entitled to it according to the facts of this matter. Motion at p. 6. Judge Reese additionally 
found that it may have been that the Grays' trial counsels made a mistake in not requesting the 
lesser included offense jury instruction. Id. 
2 
HartiU sfn i I in ill' indicated to the trial court that he was not presenting a "mistake of 
law" defense, but rather focused his defense on the idea that Christina was protecting J.G. by 
chaining him and that it was thus not child abuse. However, as argue 
brief, with no witness to rebut Dr. Corwin testimony that chaining was not a reasonable means 
to protect a child and is in the realm of psychological maltreatment/abuse, HartiU should have 
realized that tin" )niiii ' <i i ill nil llii .i " ,• llikdly loin id that t h e s e v e r e p h y s i c a l in jury o c c u r r e d i n t h e 
form of emotional harm. If HartilFs strategy was to attempt to "exonerate" Christina, then he 
either would have attempted to rebut Dr. Corwin's testimony i i laiiii'M mc lessu- in iii i » i 
offense jury instruction. HartiU made no attempt to rebut Dr. Corwin's testimony nor did he 
request the lesser-included offense jury instruction. There is no legitimate trial strategy that can 
In: .'iiiiniifinl fiiini 11,if (ill '/i hiilint1 !o do t i f f in in this matter. 
B. Appellants9 Trial Counsels' Failure to Request a Lesser-Included Offense Jury 
Instruction Was Prejudicial. 
The State next attempts to argue that Appellants have not shown prejudice from their 
counsels' deficient performance and that Appellants suffered no prejudice. Brief of Appellee at pp. 
14-23 ff i 11 ui In vi v( i that HartiU and Farris rendered deficient performance on their clients' 
behalf when they failed to request a necessary lesser-included offense jury instruction and, had they 
ilon' i" "i I"«"' "i"«1111«»i»»< i»I" f (i i •» (11,111"',"" 11" mid h a v e differed s igni f icant ly . A s argued further b e l o w , 
Appellants were prejudiced by their trial counsels' deficient performance in this regard. 
Il III I InitoiiJI Sidles Sii|iiciiit "I 'nuil Hi.is sl.ifloil .ii1,,, I tllovvs: 
...jurors are not expected to come into the jury box and leave behind all that 
their human experience has taught them. The increasing crime rate in this 
country is a source of concern to all Americans. To expect a jury to ignore this 
3 
reality and to find a defendant innocent and thereby set him free when the 
evidence establishes beyond doubt that he is guilty of some... crime requires 
of our juries clinical detachment from the reality of human experience ... 
Beckv. Alabama. 447 U.S. 625, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 2392, 65 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980). The Utah 
Supreme Court recognized that "[w]here one of the elements of the offense charged remains 
in doubt, but the defendant is plainly guilty of some offense, the jury is likely to resolve its 
doubts in favor of conviction." State v. Oldrovd. 685 P.2d 55 L 556 (Utah 1984V Therefore, 
as this Court determined, "where proof of an element of the crime is in dispute, the 
availability of the 'third option'—the choice of conviction of a lesser offense rather than 
conviction of the greater or acquittal-gives the defendant the benefit of the reasonable doubt 
standard.'" State v. Knight 2003 UT App 354, f 17,79 P.3d 969, cfrfogQldrovd at 556 (alterations 
in original) {quoting State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 167 (Utah 1983)). For this purpose, in 
State v.Simpson. this Court stated that "a defendant is entitled to a lesser offense instruction 
... precisely because he should not be exposed to the substantial risk that the jury's practice 
will diverge from theory." 904 P.2d 709, 712 (Utah App. 1995). 
The offense charged in the instant matter finds its basis under UTAH CODE ANN. §76-5-
109, which states in relevant part as follows: 
(1) As used in this section: 
• . . 
(d) "Serious physical injury" means any physical injury or set of injuries which 
seriously impairs the child's health, or which involves physical torture or causes 
serious emotional harm to the child, or which involves a substantial risk of death to 
the child, including: 
4 
(vii) any conduct toward a child which results in severe emotional harm, severe 
developmental delay or retardation, or severe impairment of the child's ability to function; 
(x) any conduct which results in starvation or failure to thrive or malnutrition that 
jeopardizes the child's life. 
(2) Any person who inflicts upon a child serious physical injury or, having the care 
or custody of such child, causes or permits another to inflict serious physical injury 
upon a child is guilty of an offense as follows: 
(a) if done intentionally or knowingly, the offense is a felony of the second degree; 
(b) if done recklessly, the offense is a felony of the third degree; or 
(c) if done with criminal negligence, the offense is a class A misdemeanor. 
The State's theory of the case as presented at trial in the instant matter pertained to the element found 
under §76-5-109(l)(d)(vii) respecting actions causing serious or severe emotional harm. In this 
respect, they called an expert on their behalf, Dr. Corwin, who testified that chaining a child was in 
the realm of psychological maltreatment/abuse. Although this testimony was elicited by the State 
in effort to prove an element of the crime charged, it was not rebutted by either defense counsel. 
Appellants' trial counsels should have recognized that, given the unrebutted expert testimony, 
it was unlikely that the jury would acquit the Appellants. Hartill and Farris conceded that the 
chaining occurred. Even if Hartill and Farris' defense left the element of intent in doubt, but the 
jury felt that the chaining proved Appellants were plainly guilty of some offense, they were 
likely to resolve any doubts they had in favor of conviction. State v. Oldrovd. 685 P.2d 551, 
556 (Utah 1984). To expect a jury to ignore the reality that the chaining occurred-when 
it was conceded by the defense— find Appellants innocent and thereby set them free when 
the evidence could have established beyond doubt that they were guilty of some crime, 
required of the jury a clinical detachment from the reality of human experience. See, Beck 
v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 2392, 65 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980). Appellants' trial 
5 
counsels were ineffective for not requesting the lesser-included offense jury instruction of a Class 
A misdemeanor and giving the jury 'third option" rather than simply hoping for a detached 
divergence-firom-theory unanimous acquittal. 
It is clear that, had the lesser-included offense jury instruction been requested, the trial court 
would have been required to give it to the jury. See, Appellant's Brief at pp. 18-29. To do so would 
have given Appellants the benefit of the reasonable doubt standard. State v. Knight 2003 UT 
App 354, f 17, 79 P.3d 969, citing Oldrovd at 556 (alterations in original) (quoting State v. 
Baker. 671 P.2d 152,167 (Utah 1983)). Based upon the evidence presented at trial, the standard 
set forth in Baker, and the fact that the evidence could have led to the acquittal on the second-degree 
felony and conviction on a Class A misdemeanor, Appellants' trial counsels were ineffective for not 
requesting the lesser-included offense jury instruction. Appellants were clearly prejudiced by their 
counsels' failure to do so. 
H. APPELLANT'S TRIAL COUNSEL WERE 
INEFFECTIVE FOR NOT CALLING AN EXPERT WITNESS 
The State in its Brief of Appellee attempts to argue that Appellants trial counsels were not 
ineffective for failing to presenting expert testimony on their behalf. Brief of Appellee at pp. 23-27. 
Specifically, the State attempts to argue that Appellants intended to elicit testimony concerning their 
mens rea, which is inadmissible under UT. R. EviD. 704 and that, even if it was admissible, the 
decision not to call an expert was a strategic decision on their trial counsels' part and therefore not 
indicative of ineffectiveness. Id 
This Court recently undertook an analysis of this issue in Fedorowiczv.State. 2005 UT App. 
405, — P.2d. —. This Court examined the prejudice prong to an ineffective assistance claim as it 
6 
pertains to failure to call and expert witness, by indicating that "[i]t is well established that trial 
tactics and strategies including what witnesses to call [and] what defenses to put forth are within the 
prerogative of counsel and are generally left to counsel's professional judgment." Fedorowicz at %2 
citing State v. Tvler. 850 P.2d 1250, 1256 (Utah 1993). "Accordingly, to establish deficient 
performance, a petitioner must 'rebut the strong presumption that under the circumstances, the 
challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy."' Id citing State v. Litherland. 2000 UT 
76,fl9,12P.3d92. 
In this matter, Dr. Beall's testimony would not have been cumulative, since no one had 
testified to the Appellant's psychological profiles or to their parenting abilities, particularly their 
parenting of a child such as J.G., who had oppositional defiant behaviors. Dr. Beall conducted 
Psychological Assessments on both Mark and Christina Gray and a Parenting Assessment, and 
undertook clinical observations and research regarding the issues germane to this case. Id Dr. 
Beall's assessments and reports were provided to the trial court prior to sentencing and are part of 
the record on appeal. Id. In the process of conducting the Parenting Assessment, Dr. Beall relied 
upon information gleaned from court tapes and records, interviews with and testing of the parents, 
testing from the children, professional research, and observations from Carol Coulter, CSW, who 
completed a comprehensive evaluation of the family. Id. 
Dr. Beall's assessments signal the necessity for undertaking these evaluations on the Grays 
and calling an expert witness in their behalf to testify at trial, which Hartill and Farris erroneously 
failed to do. CGR120; MGR112. In his parenting assessment, Dr. Beall specifically opined that 
he believed J.G. had been the product of coercive child-rearing techniques which had developed into 
an oppositional defiant behavior pattern and more severe antisocial and aggressive behaviors, 
7 
established before Christina ever became his stepmother. Id., "Parenting of Mark & Christina Gray" 
(the "Parenting Assessment9') at p. 1. With this pattern in place, it is Dr. Beall's opinion that Mark 
and Christina's lack of parenting skills may have exacerbated J.G.'s problems by attempting various 
interventions as a corresponding increase in J.G.'s resistence. Id. Dr. Beall believes this interactive 
and self-defeating cycle is what occurred between the Grays and J.G. Id. None of this information 
rises to an inadmissible opinion under UT. R. EVBD. 704, but rather gives insight into information the 
jury otherwise did not have at their disposal. 
Dr. Beall believes that J.G.'s experiences with Bonnie prior to coming to live with the Grays 
cannot be separated from the escalating problems he experienced with Mark and Christina. Hartill 
and Farris both attempted to argue this position of J.G.'s prior abuse by Bonnie in their closing 
arguments, but failed to actually present any of the information as evidence to the jury on the matter. 
Farris argued in his closing that J.G. admitted that Bonnie had done bad things to him, but Farris said 
he did not want to "...get into specifics..." because "...I think we've heard about those and I, myself 
don't want to hear about them any more." (Tr. at p. 488). In fact, Farris was mistaken in that J.G. 
was unable to testify to the abuse by Bonnie, as recognized by Dr. Beall in his assessment. Hartill 
similarly argued in his closing that "...we heard [J.G.'s] biological mother beat him, locked him up, 
denied him food and hit him in the head." (Tr. at p. 495). The jury never heard this evidence. It is 
Dr. Beall's opinion that the anger and resentment that would be expected from the abuses by Bonnie 
became a part of J.G.'s relationship with Christina. Hartill and Farris' defense strategy regarding 
this matter necessitated an expert witness to support their contention. 
The Appellants recognize that Dr. Beall would not have been able to testify as to his opinion 
respecting Appellants' mental states pertaining to the alleged crime in this matter; however, his 
8 
psychological assessments of the Appellants, together with the parenting assessment, could have 
provided helpful insight for a juror in making their ultimate decision. 
Not calling an expert such as Dr. Beall to testify in the Appellant's behalf, clearly rendered 
trial counsel ineffective. Dr. Beall had much insight into the Appellants' lives and what kind of 
people they were and how they parented. This information would have allowed the jury to have 
further insight into Appellants not otherwise presented on which to render their verdict, rather than 
simply what their neighbors and friends had to say about them. Dr. Beall's testimony would have 
been neither cumulative nor inadmissible under UT. R. EVID. 704 and, without such testimony, the 
jury was limited in its information on particularly necessary matters pertaining to Appellants and 
their psychological profiles and parenting abilities. Hartill and Farris failed to adequately advocate 
for their clients when they failed to call and expert witness on their behalf. 
ffl. DEFENDANT'S REYES CLAIM RISES 
TO EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES 
"As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised on appeal." State 
v. Holgate. 2000 UT 74, f 11,10 P.3d 346. "The preservation rule applies to every claim, including 
constitutional questions, unless a defendant can demonstrate that 'exceptional circumstances' exist 
or "plain error' has occurred." Id. Exceptional circumstances are explained as "those which would 
explain and excuse a party's failure to raise a claimed error in the trial court." State v. Webb. 790 
P.2d 65 (Utah App.1990). "The exceptional circumstances concept serves as a 'safety device,' to 
assure that manifest injustice does not result from the failure to consider an issue on appeal." State 
v. Archambeau 820 P.2d 920, 923 (Utah App. 1991). 
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"' [Exceptional circumstances' is not so much a precise doctrine, which may be analyzed in 
terms of fixed elements, as it is a descriptive term used to memorialize an appellate court's judgment 
that even though an issue was not raised below and even though the plain error doctrine does not 
apply, unique procedural circumstances nonetheless permit consideration of the merits of the issue 
on appeal." State v. Irwin. 924 P.2d 5 (Utah App. 1996). The Utah Supreme Court has similarly 
indicated that they ".. .are obliged to consider [an] argument [not presented in the proceedings below 
when] it is based on a constitutional question and defendant's liberty is at stake." State v. Jameson. 
800 P.2d 798,802-803 (Utah 1990). In State v. Lopez 831 P.2d 1040 (Utah App. 1992), this Court 
employed the "exceptional circumstances" rubric where a change in law or the settled interpretation 
of law colored the failure to have raised an issue at trial. 
In the Brief of Appellee, the State argues that Appellants' claim under Reyes pertaining to 
their reasonable doubt jury instruction was unpreserved at trial and that no exceptional circumstances 
exist to preserve the issue on appeal. See, Brief of Appellee at pp. 30-31. As argued in the Brief of 
Appellant, neither Appellants' trial attorneys nor any other attorney could have raised the issue of 
the reasonable doubt jury instruction at trial since review had been granted by the Utah Supreme 
Court after determination in State v. Reves. 2004 UT App 8, 84 P.3d 841, which had upheld 
Robertson. It was unforeseeable by any in the legal profession, save possibly those involved in 
Reves. that the Utah Supreme Court would expressly abandon and overturn an eight-year precedence 
respecting reasonable doubt jury instructions2. 
2
 It is important to note that two other cases, State v. Cruz. 2005 UT 45, and State v. 
Weaver. 2005 UT 49, were argued the same day as Reves before the Utah Supreme Court. Both 
Cruz and Weaver were arguing in favor of upholding Robertson, stating that they had been 
deprived of their rights by not having the word "obviate" used in their respective reasonable 
doubt jury instructions. Even those parties involved in Reves may not have contemplated what 
10 
The court found that the element of the Robertson test instructing the jury that the State must 
"obviate all reasonable doubt" carried with it a substantial risk that a juror may find the defendant 
guilty based on a standard that was lower than reasonable doubt. Reves. 2005 UT 33, f 30,116 P.3d 
305. Because the jury in this matter was instructed that "proof beyond a reasonable doubt is that 
degree of proof that ... obviates all reasonable doubt" there is a substantial risk that one of 
Appellants' jurors found them guilty based on a lower standard than beyond a reasonable doubt, thus 
violating Appellants' due process rights. 
The fact that Reyes had been granted review by the Utah Supreme Court, but the issue had 
not yet been decided at the time Appellants appeared for trial, colored the failure of Appellants' trial 
counsels to have raised the issue at trial. See, Lopez. The court's decision in Reyes is a constitutional 
change in the law that was not forseeable at the time of trial, which allows this matter to fall under 
the "exceptional circumstances" similarly relied upon in State v. Lopez. 831 P.2d 1040 (Utah 
App.1992). Alternatively, since Appellants' liberty is at stake here and this issue is constitutional 
this Court should be ".. .obliged to consider it even though it was not raised in the trial court." State 
v. Jameson 800 P.2d 798, 802 (Utah 1990). 
IV. APPELLANT DID NOT INVITE THE ERROR IN THE 
REASONABLE DOUBT JURY INSTRUCTION 
In the Brief of Appellee, the State mistakenly argues that Appellant invited the error 
pertaining to the reasonable doubt jury instruction because Appellant's trial counsel articulated to 
the outcome would be given that the sister cases argued at the same time were taking opposing 
positions to Reyes. The Utah Supreme Court upheld Reyes in Cruz and Weaver's cases and 
determined that Cruz and Weaver's instructions had adequately conveyed the proper standard to 
the jury without the now abandoned phrase at issue herein. 
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the court that they agreed with the final version of the jury instructions. Brief of the Appellee at pp. 
29-30. The State's argument fails in that they have failed to cite any authority indicating that invited 
error pertains to unsettled areas of law. Although it appears Utah appellate courts have not 
specifically addressed the issue of invited error as it pertains to unsettled areas of law, sister 
jurisdictions and federal courts provide guidance as to the issue. See, State v. Rothlisbereer, 2004 
UT App 226, f 14, 95 P.3d 1193 ("In circumstances in which Utah courts have not definitively 
addressed an issue, it is appropriate for us to turn to decisions and commentators that interpret related 
federal rules for guidance."), cert granted, 106 P.3d 743 (Utah 2004). 
Although not controlling, our sister jurisdiction in Colorado provides helpful insight in a 
recent case, stating that "...where an error or omission in jury instructions is attributable to 
inadvertence or attorney incompetence and not to trial strategy, a reviewing court should review for 
plain error rather than viewing the contention as waived under the doctrine of invited error." People 
v. Hodges. 2005 WL 1645760 f 25 (Colo.App.,2005). While it is clear that the doctrine of invited 
error should not apply, as the Colorado Court of Appeals indicated, the "plain error" doctrine applied 
by them in determining to review under this standard assumes that the error should have been 
obvious to the trial court. See, Berkshires. L.L.C. v. Svkes. — P.3d — , f21, 2005 WL 3434444 
(Utah App.) citinz State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, f 15,95 P.3d 276 (quoting State v. Hokate. 2000 UT 
74, f 13,10 P.3d 346 (to demonstrate plain error, a defendant must establish that (i) an error exists; 
(ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the 
eiTor, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant)). It is 
axiomatic that an error such as a change in law at the appeal stage could not have been obvious to 
12 
the trial court, however, indicating the purpose for the "exceptional circumstances" standard as 
applied in Utah and argued in Appellants' opening brief. 
The federal courts, however, have expanded upon Utah's concept of "exceptional 
circumstances" as it pertains to unsettled areas of law to include what it terms a "plain error" concept 
at the stage of appeal rather than at the trial level. The United States Supreme Court explained in 
Johnson v. United States. 520 U.S. 461, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 1549, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997), that 
"...where the law at the time of trial was settled and clearly contrary to the law at the time of appeal-
it is enough that an error be 'plain' at the time of appellate consideration." Id The United States 
Supreme Court agreed that the alternative would "...result in counsel's inevitably making a long and 
virtually useless laundry list of objections to rulings that were plainly supported by existing 
precedent." Id, 520 U.S. at 468,117 S. Ct. at 1549. United States v. Retos. analyzed this issue and 
explained that the question at issue here is not whether the error was plain at time of trial, but 
whether it is plain based on current law at the time of direct appeal 25 F.3d 1220 (3d 
Cir.l994)(emphasis added). In U.S. v. West Indies Transport, Inc., the Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals analyzed the doctrine of invited error as it applies to jury instructions and found that 
"...where a defendant submits proposed jury instructions in reliance on current law, and on direct 
appeal that law is declared constitutionally infirm, we will not apply the invited error doctrine." 127 
F.3d 299 (3rd Cir. 1997). 
Appellant's counsel did not invite the alleged error in the instant matter because, at the time 
of trial, the reasonable doubt jury instruction on which Appellant's counsel was relying was a settled 
area of law. See, State v. Robertson. 932 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1997). However, at the stage of appeal, 
the law which the instruction had relied upon was abandoned as unconstitutional. See, State v. 
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Reyes, 2005 UT 33,116 P.3d 305. Therefore, because of the substantial change in the law from the 
time of the trial to the time of direct appeal, the change to the reasonable doubt jury instruction 
should be reviewed under either Utah's "exceptional circumstances" rubric or the expanded "plain 
error" doctrine at the appeal stage, as outlined in Johnson. Retos. and West Indies supra, and not the 
invited error doctrine. 
It is not possible for Appellant's counsel to invite the alleged error when counsel did not 
know that an error would exist. Writ of Certiorari was pending in the Reyes' case at the time of the 
trial in this matter and the outcome was unpredictable. This is particularly true given that two other 
cases, State v. Cruz 2005 UT 45, and State v. Weaver. 2005 UT 49, were argued the same day as 
Reyes before the Utah Supreme Court. Both Cruz and Weaver were arguing in favor of upholding 
Robertson, stating that they had been deprived of their rights by not having the word "obviate" used 
in their respective reasonable doubt jury instructions. Even those parties involved in Reves may not 
have contemplated what that outcome would be given that the cases argued at the same time were 
taking opposing positions to Reyes3. 
The error in the reasonable doubt jury instruction was also inadvertent. See, e.g., Hodges. 
Appellant's trial counsel unintentionally agreed with the final jury instructions because they were 
unable to predict what the outcome of Reyes would be. It was not possible to object to the 
reasonable doubt jury instruction because Reves was pending. See e.g., Johnson. 520 U.S. at 468, 
117 S. Ct at 2 549. Therefore, trial counsel's failure to object at trial was inadvertent and should be 
3
 The Utah Supreme Court upheld Reyes in Cruz and Weaver's cases and 
determined that Cruz and Weaver's instructions had adequately conveyed the proper 
standard to the jury without the now abandoned phrase at issue herein. 
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reviewed under Johnson's "plain error" standard at the appeal stage, or Utah's original "exceptional 
circumstances" rubric, as argued in Appellant's opening brief. 
Although Appellant's counsel did not object to the jury instruction at trial, there were 
exceptional circumstances that created a substantial likelihood that an injustice would result. 
Allowing the jury to deliberate based on the reasonable doubt instruction "obviates all reasonable 
doubt" created the substantial likelihood that Appellant was found guilty based on a degree of proof 
that is lower than the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard required in criminal matters. See Reyes. 
As argued in Appellant's opening brief, allowing Appellants to be found guilty on a degree of proof 
that is lower than "beyond a reasonable doubt" violated their due process rights and therefore, 
created a situation of substantial injustice, allowing exceptional circumstances to apply. As the 
Appellant's liberty is at stake and this issue is constitutional, the appellate courts have previously 
determined that they are "...obliged to consider it even though it was not raised in the trial court." 
State v. Jameson 800 P.2d 798, 802 (Utah 1990). This unsettled interpretation of the law colored 
the ability of Appellant's trial counsel to raise the issue at trial. 
V. REYMDIDNOTREQUIRET^ 
REFUTE DOUBTS SUFFICIENTLY DEFINED BY THE JURY 
In State v. Reyes. 2005 UT 33, the Utah Supreme Court undertook an extensive 
analysis of their determination to abandon the Robertson test requiring the State to "obviate 
all reasonable doubt," as more particularly set forth in the Brief of Appellant. See, Brief of 
Appellant at pp. 38-39. During this analysis, the Utah Supreme Court stated as follows: 
The process suggested by the "obviate all reasonable doubt" standard is also 
flawed because, contrary to its purpose, it tends to diminish the degree of proof 
necessary to convict. . .[t]he "obviation" of doubt contemplates a two-step 
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undertaking: the identification of the doubt and a testing of the validity of the 
doubt against the evidence.. .[t]he beyond a reasonable doubt standard does 
not, however, condition a conclusion that a doubt is reasonable on an ability 
either to articulate the doubt or to state a reason for it. An unarticulated 
conviction that the State has failed to meet its burden of proof will serve as a 
legitimate basis to acquit. 
Reyes at f27. This analysis indicates that a juror is legitimate in acquitting when they have 
a doubt based on the belief that the totality of the evidence is insufficient, but cannot 
specifically articulate what that doubt may be. Reyes at f28, citing Steve Sheppard, The 
Metamorphoses ofReasonable Doubt: How Changes in the Burden ofProofHave Weakened 
the Presumption of Innocence, 78 Notre Dame L.Rev. 1165 (2003). 
The phrase that the State must "obviate all reasonable doubt" improperly permits the 
State to argue that "it need only obviate doubts that are sufficiently defined," thereby 
diminishing the State's burden. Reves at f 12. It is farreaching to believe that, in the process 
of trying to prove their case, a prosecutor would orally articulate to a jury that, if the juror 
feels doubt but cannot articulate or define it, then the State maintains no burden to overcome 
it. It is clear from the Utah Supreme Court's overall analysis of this issue that it did not 
intend for prosecutors to have to take this step in order for defendants to be protected from 
the substantial risk inherent in the phrase at issue herein. Reyes at %25-30. To require such 
would be to negate the Utah Supreme Court's position on the matter. 
VI. CRUZ UPHELD REYES 
The State attempts to argue that, since the Utah Supreme Court upheld a jury 
instruction which stated that the law requires the evidence to "dispel" all reasonable doubt 
16 
in State v.Cruz. 2005 UT 45,122 P.3d 543, and since "dispel" and "obviate" are synonyms, 
the instruction containing such "passes constitutional muster." See, Brief of Appellee at pp. 
34-35. The State's argument mistakenly attempts to overrule Reyes with Cruz while that was 
not the intent of the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Cruz. 
The Utah Supreme Court heard arguments on the case of State v. Cruz. 2005 UT 45, 
on the same date as they heard State v. Reves. 2005 UT 33. Although Reyes was determined 
nearly two months prior to Cruz. Cruz reiterates and upholds what the Utah Supreme Court 
held in Reves. Under Victor v. Nebraska., the model relied upon in the Utah Supreme 
Court's decision in Reyes and Cruz, the United States Supreme Court held that reasonable 
doubt jury instructions are unconstitutional if they allow " 'a reasonable juror ... [to] 
interpret ] the instruction to allow a finding of guilt based upon a degree of proof below that 
required by the Due Process Clause. Victor,511U.S. 1,6,114S.Ct. 1239,127L.Ed.2d583 
(1994)(citations omitted). This holding in Victor was reiterated by the Utah Supreme Court 
in Cruz, as follows: 
Reasonable doubt instructions are unconstitutional if they allow a reasonable 
juror to interpret the instruction to allow a finding of guilt based on a degree 
of proof below that required by the Due Process Clause; conversely, so long 
as the reasonable doubt instructions, taken as a whole, correctly convey the 
concept of reasonable doubt to the jury, they pass constitutional muster. 
Cruz at 121. As the Utah Supreme Court stated in Reves. the ".. .'obviate all reasonable 
doubt' element of the Robertson test carries with it the substantial risk of causing a juror to 
find guilt based on a degree of proof below beyond a reasonable doubt..." Reyes at f 30. 
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In the BriefofAppellee, the State mistakenly takes the language of Cruz out of context 
by focusing only on a small part of the Cruz decision in an attempt to set the constitutional 
standard as whether the reasonable doubt jury instructions as a whole correctly conveys the 
concept of reasonable doubt to the jury. See, Brief of Appellee at p. 34. However, according 
to the holdings in Reyes and Cruz, the reasonable doubt jury instruction cannot be correctly 
conveyed to the jury when there is a substantial risk that a juror could have found the 
defendant guilty on a degree of proof below that of "beyond a reasonable doubt." The Utah 
Supreme Court was clear that the phrase requiring the State to "obviate all reasonable doubt" 
carries that substantial risk with it. 
The State additionally attempts to argue that the Utah Supreme Court did not uphold 
Reyes when it decided Cruz by stating that the reasonable doubt jury instruction in Cruz 
contained substantively the same language as the phrase "obviate all reasonable doubt," and 
was upheld by the Utah Supreme Court. See, Brief of Appellee at pp. 34-35. The State, 
however, misreads Cruz to their own advantage. The State fails to mention that Cruz only 
challenged his instruction based on the standards articulated in Robertson, which were 
expressly abandoned by the Utah Supreme Court in Reves and could thus not be upheld for 
Cruz. Without a constitutional challenge to the phrase "dispel all reasonable doubt," the 
Utah Supreme Court was without authority to determine whether this phrase would 
additionally carry the same substantial risk as the phrase in Reyes. The State attempts to 
argue that Cruz somehow overturned the holding in Reyes respecting the "obviate all 
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reasonable doubt" phrase, but it is clear from its intentions that the Utah Supreme Court 
upheld Reyes through its determination in Cruz. 
CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing and the arguments contained in the Brief 
of Appellants filed in this matter, Appellants respectfully requests that this Court reverse the 
trial court's Judgment. 
DATED this day of , 2006. 
Barton J. Warren 
Attorney for Christina and Mark Gray 
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